

Reimagining the Idea of Sovereignty in the Era of Conflict: A Comparative Analysis with the Shambhala's Vision of Democracy

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Abstract

The current geopolitical landscape shows the erosion and fall of the basic ideology underlying traditional definition of Statecraft, this can be proved by looking at the current geopolitical dimensions, which change within a blink of an eye. From the perspective of law this shows how the Westphalian concept of sovereignty is not sufficient to maintain global order and peace in the muddled era of power dynamics.

The paper posits to re-evaluate the international governance by comparing the ancient philosophical city of Shambhala (Seen to be an enlightened society) and the current democratic structures. In Shambhala the idea of rule of law is replaced by rule of wisdom and the security of state is rather derived from ethical transparency and clarity. It tries to look at three major aspects firstly, as to how the rigid definition of sovereignty has fuelled conflict, secondly it tries to address this with the help of the concept pertaining to universal sovereignty, Thirdly and lastly it explores how the power dynamics can be changed to lay down a more neutral framework.

It aims to drive the global tensions into an uncharted territory that is yet to be discovered but is based on the conceptual ideal of fairness and justice, offering a different jurisprudential stance in the 21st century as it is the era dominated by regular friction.

Keywords: International Conflict, Shambhala, Sovereignty, International law, Public law

The Status Quo: International Affairs at the Juncture of Geopolitical conflict

The current world order is not as stable as before showing how our concept of sovereignty as provided in the Treaty of Westphalia is inadequate to address the ongoing issues. We can identify sovereignty as a principle laid down under Art 2(1) of UN Charter that states about equality and Art 2(4) requiring refrain from use of threat or force against the independence or territorial integrity of another state, serving as basic framework in international law. (U.N. Charter arts. 2(1)) It is also part of the customary law and is reinforced over the time by judicial participation like the International Court of Justice emphasizing the need for non-intervention in the case of *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua*. (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986) But over contemporary reality of geopolitics narrates another story of sovereignty being a flexible skeleton that can be shaped as per strategic interests, political narratives, and power. (Marti Koskeniemi, 2005) The outcome of such new found principle is fragmentation and loss of legal consistency, leading to conflicts that are part and parcel of the structure.

The first in line for this is the current escalation from February 28, 2026 which started with U.S & Israel's Operation Epic Fury against Iran's programs of nuclear and ballistic missiles, it made about 900 strikes aiming to change the regime. (US-Israel strikes on Iran: February/March 2026, 2026) The initial strikes put to death the Supreme Leader, while Iran's retaliation which had 900 missiles and 3000 drones against 13 other countries and also blocked the strait of Hormuz skyrocketing the oil prices across the globe (Iran-Israel War Updates on March 19, 2026), which was condemned by the UN Security Council through

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resolution 2817 (Security Council Adopts Resolution 2817 (2026), 2026). This resolution itself was engulfed by vacuum owing to its one-sided approach of holding retaliation wrong weakening the sovereign protections of the charter. Further because US held presidency the council became even structurally incompetent to check the legality of initial strikes. Making the idea that self defence is rather hay-wire concept, meaning if I see a state to be existential threat without any proof of imminent danger another state has the right to attack (Yuval Shany & Amichai Cohen, 2026). So, we have come back to think that even if something is illegal it can be legitimate decreasing the value of Art 2(4), this means we recognise some states as just a target that has to be worked upon rather than looking at them as legitimate sovereign power giving us the right to police them in case of a mistake.

Further the foundational norms of the international law have been challenged by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, in 2014 Russia annexed Crimea and went on to a full-scale invasion in 2022 against Ukraine, both of which are clear violations against the prohibition to use force and the need to respect territorial sovereignty (G.A. Res. ES-11/1, 2022). The UN General Assembly's multiple resolutions have condemned these actions (G.A. Res. 68/262, 2014). However, this can be identified surface level while beneath this lies the transformation of sovereignty itself as a concept, while Russia takes to justify its actions on the basis of protection to ethnic Russians and historical unity as well as concerns upon NATO based expansion it takes to reframe what is sovereignty relying on necessity and civilisational identity. (Vladimir Putin, 2014) This can be called as '*revisionist Sovereignty*' where the definition remains lucid and can be changed to align with one's strategic objectives. (Michael J. Glennon, 2003) To these violations the response was in terms of sanctions, economic isolations etc which are collective measures by western states again going against the idea of non-intervention that is cardinal to holding statehood. (Tom Ruys & Cedric Ryngaert, 2016) So, it was not erosion that is single sided but is dual in its dimension including both enforcement based on conditions and instability due to violation.

A similar kind of tension can be observed in terms of the Israel-Palestine conflict where sovereignty is the matter of contest. Israel states that it is exercising its inherent right of self defence under Art 51 while Palestinians demand the right to self-determination which is a right towards all as per ICJ (U.N. Charter art. 51; Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970). In the is Wall Advisory opinion ICJ affirmed the need to give this right to Palestinian's who have been occupying the land from long. (Legal Consequences of the Construction of, 2004) Since October 2023 there has been an escalation of violence and thereby a scrutiny of this issue is also intensified with looking at it from humanitarian, proportionality, protection of civilians, and distinction principles (Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection, 1949). However, though the issues are pointed out or clearly mentioned its enforcement is still something that is inconsistent showing how structural asymmetric the idea of equality and sovereignty are. (Marco Sassòli, 2019). As many scholars have pointed out in order to see how the international law operates it is to see how the conflict exemplifies, which are usually shaped by geopolitical needs rather than the philosophy of universal application. (Antony Anghie, 2005)

The South China Sea has also not remained free of such claims, now it has almost become a construction race between Vietnam and China. The declining authority of the adjudicatory institutions also is the reason why democracy has discoloured, though in *Philippines v. China* the PCA (Permanent Court of Arbitration) unequivocally held that the claims over nine-dash line lack legal basis under UNCLOS (South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), 2013), China has still continued the Island building activities with military presence showing how selective compliance as become more of a norm (U.N. Convention on the Law of, 1982). Philippines has gone to sign new defence pacts with Japan to reduce and deter naval aggressions. Reflecting how exactly fragmentation occurs in world order, where interests overweigh obligations. (James Crawford, 2019) The dichotomy rather lies when the smaller states rely on alliances and legal mechanism and those states with power choose

control and strategic dominance. (Andrew Hurrell, 2007) This form of asymmetry automatically looks down upon the validity of the international institutions.

The evolving nature of sovereignty can also be understood by India-China border disputes that led to the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020 owing to the tensions across the Line of Actual control (LAC) where territory itself remains a dispute before even asserting territorial integrity, it also shows how international frameworks have failed to address them (S. Jaishankar, 2020). In this case both the countries assert claims that are historically and culturally rooted but have resorted to certain diplomatic as well as calibrated military actions to combat the situation (M. Taylor Fravel, 2008). This is yet another dimension to the existing theory speaking of something called as the 'managed sovereignty' where the entire system is based on fragile equilibrium and here restraint and assertion both tend to co-exist (Shashank Joshi, 2020). But yet due to the overall volatility of the region the traditional systems have yet failed to resolve the dispute.

When we look at all these states of affairs, we can see crisis in the existing model of sovereignty that arises from the Westphalian treaty. In the long run it has not bought stability but has made sovereignty more fluid, instrumentalised and contested (Hersch Lauterpacht, 1950). This has been invoked to justify actions that are rather aggressive or selectively enforced or are even based on interests (Ian Brownlie, 2008). *Stephan Krasner* went on to call this as 'organised hypocrisy' where the formal recognition of the principle of sovereignty co-exists along with its repeated violations (Stephen D. Krasner, 1999). On the other hand, *Anne-Marie Slaughter* has stated the due to interconnectedness in global operations sovereignty has become a more conditional and networked concept. (Anne-Marie Slaughter, 2004) The collective effect of this the inconsistency in law and disrupted global order.

This exposes the limitations of our democratic structures at the global level. As any modern democracy won't consider universal ethics over national interests when decision making is done under a state-centric law (David Held, 1995). Due

to this from the so-called democratic processes we produce and exemplify hierarchies, power structures, dominance than collective justice or equity (Joseph S. Nye, 2011). Combining we reach a paradox: where democracy that aims for accountability, stability and peace operates within a state that is driven by inequality and conflict. This requires that we make a shift, a shift that is more ethically grounded and nuanced as procedural legitimacy alone is not sufficient to sustain the entire world order. (Jürgen Habermas, 2001) Thereby a transformation to a system whose normative foundation is based on transparency, coherence and shared responsibility is needed, *Shambhala* which is both a philosophy as well as a governance model envisions some that is similar and is based on clarity, morality, wisdom and collective consciousness. This is an alternative that transcends the limitations of the structures that we operate in today, it doesn't derive authority coercive power or even representation but from ethical alignment reduce the incentives to any conflict.

Sovereignty: The Concept Who's Rigidity Fuels Conflict

The idea of what is sovereign goes back to 1648 which marks the birth of modern regime at international level, which basically transformed the world from overlapping religions to border marked nations. The Westphalia involves the treaties signed at *Osnabruck & Munster* to end the Thirty in Holy Roman Empire and Eighty Years war between Dutch republic and Spain, this conflict had gone to decimate one-third of German state's populations but it had just began as a religious struggle between Catholics and Protestants and went on to involve major European powers. After decades of warfare, famine, and disease about 109 delegates gathered to negotiate on peace and in October they agreed upon a system that balances power between states that are independent on their own. (The Peace of Westphalia and Sovereignty, 2026) It stated three main things on sovereignty, firstly, putting forth that '*it's his religion, whose realm it is*' (*Cuius Regio, Eius Religio*) confirming the exclusive right of the ruler to make his domestic laws and set his religion, secondly it spoke of equality holding that all states are equal irrespective of their military or

their size, and thirdly it upheld non-interference meaning that it made sovereignty exclusive and created a shield on borders to ensure that one is not laying across their pebbles in other's pond (The Peace of Westphalia and Sovereignty, 2026). This concept of 1648 is somewhat rigid for the 21st century as it creates an assumption that what happens inside the country's borders should stay there creating friction in with the ideology of human rights as it allows leaders to act as they wish with their citizens. Doctrines like the 'responsibility to protect' directly move against these first ideologies. Secondly, the way sovereignty is shaped today makes it conditional, but the traditional ideology still remains the same.

Though sovereignty is seen as bedrock of international regime it is not completely neutral or timeless, but is a concept that was constrained by history managing to evolve alongside the geopolitics. Its first origins can be traced back to early Europe, where scholars like *Jean Bodin* maintained that sovereignty is 'perpetual & absolute power' within a country (Jean Bodin, 1576), later thinkers as *Lassa Oppenheim* refined this to describe it as Supreme as well as Legally unrestrained authority or power of a state (Lassa Oppenheim, 1905). This conception was absolutist and maybe it was the need of the hour at that time as it came from the shackles of falling Europe, due to claims from empire, feudal lords, and even the Church that saw rights to rule. From this came the idea of centralised power with states (Martti Koskenniemi, 2005). In the *Island of Palmas* arbitration, the doctrine was crystallised to mean nothing but territorial control which is exclusive by nature (*Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.)*, 1928). Thereby, from the very start sovereignty was never about co-operating but about control and exclusion.

So as observed this form of logic became institutionalised via the Westphalian treaty (Leo Gross, 1948) that transformed sovereignty into a shield that was mutually agreed upon. (Derek Croxton, 1999) With time the UN charter codified them as prohibition of use of force and the doctrine of sovereign equality. (U.N. Charter arts. 2(1)) But while achieving this magnum opus what is often overlooked is that such concept of sovereignty is for political units that are insulated, with less to no

interdependence and limited interactions. In today's world it either has to be dynamic or has to be replaced to ensure continuity to adapt to the global realities.

The issue doesn't persist in violation therefore, but in the very structure of what sovereignty exactly is? By running on non-inference and exclusivity a system of prioritising national interest over any form of collective responsibility is established, which in turn affects the global stability (Stephen D. Krasner, 1999). It is a defence to secure authority and protect oneself from external scrutiny at last even in the cases of crises to humanity. (Hersch Lauterpacht, 1950) It cannot address contemporary challenges like climate change, economic interdependence, transnational terrorism, etc that tend to transcend the borders and require co-operative action, (U.N. Convention on the Law of, 1982) what value does UN hold if sovereignty is to be strictly followed, and at the same time if it is to be dismissed fully how do we control conflict? In this regard, sovereignty not only fails the to resolve conflicts but also aggravates them.

If we were to look at specific instances where the existing concept of sovereignty is but a weak link, the following cases can be put forth:

- When sovereignty acts as a shield it paralyses the world community at the time of crises, like in case of the Syrian Civil War the government as stuck with its sovereign right to justify military action against its own population (World Report 2026: Syria, 2026), China and Russia have gone forward to blocking intervention by veto power. By making this time of sovereignty absolute we are actually approving authoritarianism.
- Territorial disputes become a zero-sum game where joint management of resources or shared sovereignty cannot exist.
- Paper protection is not reality, in case of Democratic Republic of Congo, its rebel group M23 has annexed South and North Kivu provinces but UN still recognises DRC as a sovereign though it has no

factual control (Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2026).

- Today we face scarcity in terms of lot of resources and if we were to play blind sovereignty shall fuel it, transboundary resources should be owned collectively, like the case of Indus river where China lies Upstream and India Downstream, in case of rigid claim it becomes an existential threat to survival (The 2026 Global Conflict Assessment: Probability, 2026).
- We have digital borders so its not only about land anymore but also about data, countries today focus on having a shield so their data is not controlled by foreign companies (A New Era of Self-Reliance: Navigating, 2025), like the Silicon shield on the Taiwan Strait. (Global Risks to the EU in, 2026) Its not possible to cut subsea cables to protect such borders, which can even disrupt at the times of crises communication.

In Consequently, the existence of sovereignty in the traditional sense poses a fundamental obstacle to achieving both effective governance and peace. Its rigid insistence on autonomy & territoriality creates a competitive global order where asymmetries in power dictate what's to be done and where to apply the rule. (James Crawford, 2019) This issue exposes sovereignty as something that loses its normative value to be a foundation in modern democracy, particular at the world level, where everything is being driven to fragmentation (Anne-Marie Slaughter, 2004). To move over and above this impasse, the idea itself has to be reconceptualised to become a right that though exists is not absolute but a responsibility that is cooperative and ethical. (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996) This shift is much needed as it is more inclusive and grounded with universality.

Shambhala: The Utopian Ideology & Its Conception of Democracy

Shambhala, is a city and ideology of construct that has mythological origins within the Tibetan Buddhist Traditions. It represents a normative spiritual order that is presented in the *Kalachakra*

Tantra, where ethical order or dharma, governance or rajya, cosmic time or kala are linked together inseparably. (Vesna A. Wallace, 2004) This system is not grounded in the institutional authority but its legitimacy is derived from Paramartha or the only ultimate truth, it tries to remove any distinctions between governance as today and metaphysics (Vesna A. Wallace, 2004, at 12--18.). It is envisioned as an enlightened hidden kingdom that is not a mere geographical space but a society where citizens partake with rulers and have the same mortal consciousness. (Edwin Bernbaum, 1980) The *Kalachakra tantra* lays down a vision of existence through the 'Wheel of time', there the three dimensions of reality that is inner, outer and ultimate are integrated, out from this framework is Shambhala that speaks of ideal polity (*rajyavyavastha*) where all these three dimensions run together in harmony (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, at 25--30.). It mirrors the idea of '*yathā bāhyam tathā adhyātmam, yathā adhyātmam tathā param*' (Kubjikāmatatantra 25.123, 2026) (inner is the outer and outer the supreme) meaning the external order is the reflection of internal consciousness showing how the any form of political order whether national or international cannot be separated from inner discipline (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, at 31--35.). The Buddha who is seen as the main seer of Buddhism is said to have transmitted these teachings to King Sucandra who named and institutionalised this principle to be called the *Shambhala*. (Tenzin Gyatso, 1985) It looked at a model of sovereignty based on Dharma where authority is derived from knowledge enlightened and not any form of power institutions (Tenzin Gyatso, 1985).

The Kalki or Kulika rulers take up the responsibility to govern Shambhala across different life times with spiritual wisdom as well as authority (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, at 45--52.) this rulership is legitimatised by Dharma and not by command as per Austin or force. (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996) *Manjusrikirti* who is a King recognises society as integration of various traditions to form one unified framework showing a synthesis and establishment of unity by sharing of knowledge systems, Shambhala aligns well with the thought (Alexander Berzin, 2003). *Pundarika's*

Vimalaprabha throws light on the political dimensions of the Kalachakra system saying that any form of governance should come from inner realisation that joins itself into the collective pool of order, thereby putting them all into the same canopy (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, at 78--102.).

But the narrative of Shambhala itself gained prominence through its modern interpretations, among whom *Chogyam Trungpa* reimagined it as a way in which modern societies could function on collective awareness and basic goodness (Chögyam Trungpa, 1984). Like Plato speaks of Philosopher Kings Shambhala envisions them to be both sages and rulers stating that they are *rajrishis* like King Janaka. Though there might be institutional structures here but authority comes from *Bhudhi* and *Gyan* (David Snellgrove, 1987), it brings in wisdom that can recognise equality and no hierarchy can take to replace the same.

It is a structured polity and has institutions as well as a society that is organised but all of the remain under the authority of Dharma and materiality comes second to achieving spirituality (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, at 110--120.). In legal sense the governance doesn't need sovereignty but requires in its place transparency, integrity, and wisdom. Authority thereby cannot be monopolised or imposed but comes from judgment, though the over reign of dharma makes it appear like the concept of rule of law it is replaced by what is known as the rule of wisdom (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, at 63--70.) It looks at a non-adversarial practice unlike modern democracies. Like in any democracy even here there is participatory structure creating a network of professionals or experts that have common goals, beliefs, and similar knowledge (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996). We have divisions and they are common but the Kalachakra sets them aside and gives a unified identity so that no differentiation occurs from first instance (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, at 120--126.).

It is also part of the famous prophecy of *Rudra Kalkin* (the 10th avatar of Krishna) speaks about restoration of order by an action that is decisive and brings back the cycle of time (referring to cosmic renewal). (Chögyam Trungpa, 1984, at 320--325.) As the time itself is recognised to be cyclical in the system of Kalachakra and hence the governance

we have will have its own phases of decline and renewal also pointing that any political order is to be dynamic and responsive to what happens around and not remain static, showing how the idea of sovereignty or democracy have to be upgraded with time. There are four prominent things to note in the Shambhala regime, firstly it is the 'Gnostic Democracy', which is a polity based on knowledge, the *adhikara* corresponds to realization and not because one holds a position, meaning that knowledge is highest post, if one has the *Gyana* to understand what is just and what is unjust then he is eligible to hold that position, irrespective of the fact whether he/she has gained votes or not. Any sought of political participation is not denied but one has to become capable for it i.e. it is contingent on succeeding by intellectual and spiritual refinement. The democracy is ontological sustaining that one can partake in governance only to the extent that they can align with truth or dharma, so authority exists but its basis is realisation and not power. (Edwin F. Bryant, 2001)

Secondly, if we come to sovereignty, it is divided further into three parts, the sovereignty firstly is non-territorial in nature i.e. it is not *ksetradhikara* that a country has but a non-spatial element like Shambhala itself that is inaccessible or hidden, but what is this non-spatial element it is dharma, so its authority is legitimacy based meaning until I do right I have authority and lose it when I uphold wrong, physical visibility has nothing to do with power or control. True sovereignty is deterritorialized and can exist without any maps or geography (Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1.3.3). Thirdly, its internal sovereignty or the concept of *Svarajya* as stated earlier it speaks about the principle of self-rule, one has to master their intellect, senses, and mind to have true control the same can be expanded to a state where one can create change at the first level to reach the next. It also further extends the microcosm-macrocosm idea of the human body mirroring the *brahmanda* replacing domination. (David L. Snellgrove, 1987)

Lastly and fourthly, it is civilisational sovereignty of preserving what exists to uphold right and condemn the wrong, here expansion is not pursued by states but they rather focus on restoration and protection of order. Authority is thereby exercised to continue the value system and the state becomes

a custodian, so most importantly such kind of state is only reactive and not aggressive so in the moments of crises it tries to re-establish balance but not destroy any further, it basically considers sovereignty as responsibility rather than power (Chögyam Trungpa, 1984). This model of Shambhala forms a very compelling alternative to what we have today, it can address certain deficiencies inherent in the systems today. As we know that interest is not a primary agenda in this kind of conceptualisation of the state. (Anne-Marie Slaughter, 2004)

Accordingly, the discourse in this area offers response to the complexities in the modern world because as we see the world today, we can agree that legal reforms alone cannot change major aspects and they are also inadequate in response. If we were to advance the modern governance systems to be inclined to universal responsibility and shared ethical coherence the probability of looking at the problem this intense would be less. Shambhala tries to bridge this conceptual ideal between necessity and idealism.

Changing The Dynamics Of Power: Moving Towards A Neutral Framework

The modern international order doesn't fail because there is absence of rules but it fails as those rules no longer enforce the behaviour that they state (U.N. Charter arts. 2(1), 1986). From escalation in Iran to the situation in Ukraine, from the Palestine's conflict to the claims in South China Sea what we all witness is not violation of some law but interpretation of democracy and sovereignty selectivity to justify their power. (Stephen D. Krasner, 1999) Sovereignty is awakened to shield the power & aggression, democracy on the other hand is invoked to legitimise this and what international law does is reacting rather than laying down proper guidance (Stephen D. Krasner, 1999). The consequence is that we are today building a system where conflict is no more just accidental but proceeds structurally as states function within a structure where dominance is rewarded over restraint (Stephen D. Krasner, 1999).

But what Shambhala has to give, in contrast, is not a space that is utopian and can escape completely from politics, but a shift from the foundation of this

politics (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, 250--260 (2004).). Instead of looking at who has the territory, it looks at who is right or who follows the dharma. (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996) Though it is a change to a new philosophy it has implications on the real world. If we were to consider sovereignty to be ethical legitimacy then conflicts as the South China Sea will no longer be a zero-sum game but will turn into responsibility which is shared and authority that has to be justified for every action (Luboš Bělka, 2007). It opens up new models like demilitarised zones, cooperative governance, joint stewardship etc which are dismissed today as we take high regard to treating territorial sovereignty as absolute (Luboš Bělka, 2007). Similarly, by applying epistemic participation as well we can see transformation in democratic functions, world is engulfed by war, interventions, sanctions due to strategic interest, public sentiment, or expediency rather than because of reasoning that is based on sound ethical considerations, (Chögyam Trungpa, 1984) Shambhala doesn't set aside participation but it redefines its status as not contribution of voice but as capacity to judge wise at a given juncture. Now global decision making if applied as per this idea will not be limited to representatives of state alone but communities that hold wisdom like legal scholars, scientists, civil societies, ethicists, who are not affected by any national or state interests (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996). This would in fact alter UN from a place of negotiation to a place of deliberation based on reason where quality of judgment is important than the quantity of the votes that one has or even the power to veto. (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996) Most practical oriented approach in this field will be to move towards Dharma from coercion, we at present rely on enforcement via military, political or economic pressure. But as observed repeatedly these actions call for more tensions than actually resolve them, so what is better? It is better to reorient this enforcement where goal is to restore responsibility (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996, at 220--230.). We can give priority to dialogue, reconciliation in long term over deterrence and movement towards justice, it is helpful for conflicts like Israel-Palestine, where traditional enforcements failed as they cannot take into consideration the historical

and ethical aspects of the conflict (Francis M. Deng et al, 1996).

If states focus on *svarajya* they could practise restraint, clarity in ethics, and self-regulation, most conflicts arise because of competition, identity and fear that are automatically projected into relations with other countries. Over the time governing internal sovereignty would reduce conflict as it no longer remains the first action or response (Stephen D. Krasner, 1999). The concept of civilisational sovereignty is also a neutral regime in divided world, if we don't go by identities of religion, nation, ideology, we don't have to worry about whose identity shall prevail over the other but will focus upon what values are better than the other and how they have to be preserved (US-Israel strikes on Iran: February/March 2026, 2026).

Neutral global frameworks can be created based on this for concerns such as resource scarcity and distribution, climate change, protection of humanitarian aspects, etc instead of focusing on dominance or competing to procure first, states become custodians for shared assets and have a collective order, so we basically replace control with responsibility, power with wisdom, and competition with co-existence.

So, what Shambhala seeks is not who has the power to rule or who has the capacity to restraint but who has the wisdom to hold that power and rule.

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